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Abstract
The transparency and openness of the monetary policymaking
process at the Bank of England has provided very detailed information
on both the decisions of individual members of the Monetary Policy
Committee and the information on which they are based. In this pa-
per we consider this decision making process in the context of a model
in which ination forecast targeting is used but there is heterogeneity
among the members of the committee. We nd that rational partisan
theory can explain spatial voting behaviour under forecast uncertainty
about the output gap. Internally generated forecasts of output and
market generated expectations of medium term ination provide the
best description of discrete changes in interest rates, in combination
with uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. There is also a
role for developments in asset housing and labour markets. Further,
spatial voting patterns clearly di¤erentiates between internal and ex-
ternally appointed members of the Monetary Policy Committee. The
results have important implications for committee design and the con-
duct of monetary policy.
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1 Introduction1
There is a substantial literature in the US that uses information from tran-
scripts of the proceedings of the FOMC to study the monetary policymaking
process. See for example Belden (1989), Havrilesky and Gildea (1992), Mc-
Gregor (1996), Chappell and McGregor (2004) and Chappell et al. (2005).
This body of work has provided a number of insights into how committees
work and the role played by individual members (especially the Chairman),
and has been followed much more recently by studies of the monetary pol-
icymaking process of the Bank of England. In 1992, the United Kingdom,
following New Zealand and Sweden, adopted ination targeting. This was
augmented by a much more open system of decision-making, but ultimately
decisions on interest rates were still made by the Government. In 1997 the
Bank of England was given full operational independence. To support this
new policy regime, very detailed information about interest rate decisions
has been provided. Recent literature has used such detailed information, in-
cluding votes by individual members, to study several aspects of monetary
policymaking at the Bank of Englands Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).2
The above empirical literature highlights the fact that policymakers tend
to di¤er signicantly in the interest rate changes they would prefer. This
points to heterogeneity in beliefs across members in a monetary policy com-
mittee. Spatial voting theory (Downs, 1957; Black, 1958), where voters eval-
uate admissible options and cast their vote on the alternative that is closest
to their own ideal point, is a potentially useful framework to identify and
study such heterogeneity. At the same time, two important political business
cycle theories have developed that can explain observed persistent di¤erences
in voting behaviour. While rational partisan theory (Chappell and Keech,
1986; Alesina, 1987, 1988) posits that committee members are ideologically
motivated but consistent with their policy preference over time, opportunistic
business cycle theory (Nordhaus, 1975; Persson and Tabellini, 1990) suggests
1We are grateful to Stephanie Daniel for research assistance. The paper has bene-
ted from comments by Jagjit Chadha, David Cobham, Andrew Hughes Hallett, Marcus
Miller and Charles Nolan, as well as participants at the MMF Conference, the ECB and
European University Institute. The detailed review and constructive comments made by
two anonymous referees and a Co-Editor helped improve the paper substantially. Their
contribution is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.
2See, for example, Chadha and Nolan (2001), Cobham (2002a, b, 2003), Gerlach-
Kristen (2004), Bhattacharjee and Holly (2008) and Hix et al. (2007).
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that members ideologically close to the incumbent party may attempt to use
their policies to stimulate output before elections. While evidence on both
these theories has in general been mixed3, there is some evidence that mon-
etary policy making in the Bank of England may be explained partly by
political business cycles (Hix et al., 2007).
In this paper we consider the monetary policy decision making process in
the context of a model in which ination forecast targeting is used but there
is heterogeneity among the members of the Committee. This heterogeneity
does not arise so much from di¤erences in preferences about ination and out-
put, as from di¤erences in information assimilation.4 Specically, we argue
that forecast uncertainty may produce partisan e¤ects on private estimates
of the output gap. Under rational voting by ination targeting members,
this in turn translates into di¤erences in voting behaviour within the MPC.
However, while most spatial voting applications to monetary policy assume
a one-dimensional representation, we nd evidence of a preference space in
two dimensions. The traditional dove-hawk view is complemented with the
activist-pacist dimension, where external members are either activists or
pacist-doves and all internal members are pacist-hawks. These ndings
have important implications for committee design, voting methods as well as
appointment of new members.
Our paper touches on a number of additional issues connected to mone-
tary policy. First, there is a large literature that examines the usefulness of
characterising monetary policy in terms of a rule.5 Based on the argument in
Svensson (1997a,b) that, given the long and variable lags inherent in policy,
it might make more sense to target a forecast of ination rather than its cur-
rent value, we use the Svensson (1997a) ination forecast targeting model in
preference to the Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). Second, interest rate decisions
are made in real time and based on current information, while there is often
considerable uncertainty about the current state of the economy; see, among
others, Orphanides (1998). In this paper we assume that the ltering which
is required of current, imperfect measures of economic activity takes place
3See, for example, Alesina and Summers (1993), McGregor (1996), Carlsen and Peder-
sen (1999), Chappell and McGregor (2004) and Berlemann and Markwardt (2007).
4The common assumption that preferences concerning output and ination vary be-
tween members (Neumann, 2002; Sibert, 2003) is not consistent with an ination targeting
central bank. Instead, we highlight heterogeneity in information acquisition about a supply
shock, which is potentially costly; see also Lagerlöf (2001).
5See Svensson (1997a), Woodford (1999) and Orphanides (2003) for further discussion.
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as part of the internal procedures of the Bank of England.6 Our empirical
results indicate that forecasts of ination and output provides the best ex-
planation of UK monetary policy since 1997, which supports the ination
forecast targeting rule. Third, we nd some evidence that developments in
asset markets matter, which is in line with the extensive literature on the
role of asset markets in monetary policy decisions.7
Information on the precise voting record of each member allows investi-
gation of heterogeneity across the MPC, for which we nd substantial evi-
dence. This raises the question as to why there is heterogeneity across the
Committee in the rst place, given that they all share a common pool of
information and individual members have many opportunities to make their
views known prior to an interest rate decision. In this paper, we assume that
all MPC members are ination targeters, so that preference heterogeneity is
absent. Instead we believe that heterogeneity reects di¤ering views of the
world, with some members attaching greater importance to particular devel-
opments in the economy than others. Some individual members may attach
greater importance to developments on the supply side, which in the pres-
ence of forecast uncertainty translates into di¤erent views on the size of the
output gap. Similarly, some other members may attach greater importance
to asset markets, while others may disagree with the majority view because
they believe the transmission mechanism of monetary policy is di¤erent.8
We model the process of information acquisition under heterogeneity as a
signal extraction problem, with individual members optimally combining the
forecast of the majority with their own views. We nd that heterogeneity in
the reaction to macroeconomic uncertainty generate spatial voting patterns
that clearly di¤erentiate between internal and external MPCmembers. These
results support rational partisan theory and have important implications for
the institutional setting and conduct of monetary policy.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we present a simple model
of ination forecast targeting and discuss possible sources of heterogeneity
and then turn to the contribution rational partisan theory can play in ex-
plaining this heterogeneity. In section 3 we discuss the estimation problem.
6See Budd (1998) for a description.
7See, for example, Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001).
8See, for example, Beldens (1989) analysis of dissents in FOMC votes and Chadha and
Nolans (2001) analysis in the UK context. Other measures of uncertainty discussed in the
literature include forecast revisions (Chadha and Nolan, 2001) and dispersion in survey
correspondentsviews on ination (Bomberger, 1996).
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In section 4 we report and discuss our empirical results. Finally, we present
conclusions in section 5.
2 The Model
We adopt a highly stylised model of the monetary policymaking process
and abstract from many issues that have been the focus of much of the
recent literature. We do this deliberately in order to have a model that
appears to align best with how central banks view the monetary transmission
process and to provide a justication for the way in which policy appears to
be conducted.9 This allows us to show that when there are delays in the
monetary transmission process so that changes in interest rates take time to
e¤ect output and in turn for output to a¤ect ination, the monetary authority
uses a so-called `ination forecastingrule. This in turn has implications for
the way in which interest rates are set. Within the context of this simple
stylised model, we introduce a role for heterogeneity amongst members of
the Monetary Policy Committee.
2.1 The ination process
Our model for the ination process is structured as follows:
t = t 1 + yt 1 + t (1)
yt = 1yt 1   2(rt 1   t 1) + t (2)
t is the ination rate in period t, yt is the output gap (the di¤erence
between the log of output and the log of potential output), and rt the nominal
interest rate. t, a supply shock and "t, a demand shock, are iid shocks in
period t not observable in period t 1. The coe¢ cients  and 2 are positive;
1 (0 < 1 < 1) measures the degree of persistence in the output gap. The
output gap depends negatively on the real lagged interest rate. The change
in ination depends on the lagged output gap. The output gap is normalised
to zero in the long run.
These pure delays in the impact of the output gap on ination and of
interest rates on the output gap captures in the most straightforward way
9In particular, for expositional purposes we ignore forward-looking expectations and
issues arising consequently from time inconsistency.
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the central bankers stylised model of the monetary transmission process.
The modern generation of New Keynesian models with nominal inertia and
imperfect competition still exhibit jumps in output and ination in response
to shocks which will blur the pure delays embodied in equations (1) and (2).
The intertemporal loss function is:
Lt =
1
2
Et
1X
=t

 t

(   )2

+ y2

: (3)
Here, Et denotes expectations conditional on information available in period
t.  is the ination target, and  is the discount rate (0 <  < 1). The
policymaker minimises the present discounted value of squared deviations of
ination from its target and the output gap.  is the weight the policymaker
attaches to the output gap, with the weight on ination normalised to unity.
For the special case of  = 0; so the policymaker only targets ination,
the central bank can (in expectation) use the current interest rate to hit the
target for ination two periods hence. So the intertemporal problem can
be written as a sequence of single period problems. In this case (Svensson,
1997a):
Lt =
1
2

t+2jt   
2
; (4)
where t+2jt is the forecast of ination at time period t+2 based on informa-
tion available in period t. The central bank minimises the squared deviation
of the current two-year ination forecast, t+2jt, from the target. The forecast
of t+2 at t is
t+2jt = t+1jt + yt+1jt
and
yt+1jt = 1ytjt   2(rt   tjt); (5)
where the subscript tjt indicates that current realisations of the output gap
and ination may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.
So:
t+2jt = 

1ytjt   2(rt   tjt)

+ t+1jt: (6)
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Then the rule for setting the interest rate by the monetary authority is:
rt = tjt +
1
2
(t+1jt   ) + 1
2
ytjt: (7)
Although an explicit weight is not attached to output losses, current
(forecasted) output appears in the rule because the current output gap is
informative about future ination. Recall that this rule is designed to ensure
that ination in period t+2 is on the target, . Suppose, initially in period
t, the actual ination rate and the ination rate in the next period were equal
to the target and the output gap, yt, is zero. In this case rt = tjt. Let there
then be a demand shock, t+1 > 0 in period t+ 1 that raises yt+1 and drives
ination in period t + 2 above target. In order, in the face of the positive
demand shock to ensure that ination in period t + 3 is back on target, the
monetary authority leans against the rise in yt+1 and against the expected
rise in ination in t+ 2.
There are three key features of this relationship that bear upon the em-
pirical work we report later.
First, decisions about interest rates in period t depend upon expectations
of what ination will be in the future. This is the ination forecasting rule
proposed by Svensson. It can be contrasted for example with the standard
Taylor rule in which the interest rate responds to current or lagged realisa-
tions of ination and output.
Secondly, In Svenssons original formulation tjt and ytjt are known. In
practice, as Orphanides (1998) has pointed out, current ination and the cur-
rent output gap are not observed in real time. For expositional purposes we
are assuming that the decision period coincides with the observation period.
In practice data are available at di¤erent frequencies from daily to yearly.10
And, thirdly, the form of the rule has important implications for the
conduct of monetary policy. In the simple model above the policymaker can
only a¤ect ination two periods into the future. At each point in time when
a decision is being made, the policymaker sets the interest rate to achieve (in
expectation) the target in two periods time.11 To quote a former member of
the MPC.
10It is straight forward to cast this problem of optimally combining data of di¤erent
frequencies as a ltering problem. See for example, Corrado and Green (1988).
11It is being assumed here that the policy horizon corresponds to two years (or so) into
the future (see King 2002).
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"When I was a member of the MPC I thought that I was trying,
at each forecast round, to set the level of interest rates so that,
without the need for future rate changes, prospective (forecast)
ination would on average equal the target at the policy hori-
zon. This was, I thought, what the exercise was supposed to be."
(Goodhart, 2001).
In practice the MPC meets monthly, and sets the interest rate in order to
achieve the target ination rate at the policy horizon. However, a decision to
change the interest rate in period t (relative to the decision that was made in
period t 1) can only be the result of new information becoming available in
period t.12 For example, new information suggesting a build up in pressures
in labour markets may call for a rise in interest rates in order to keep ination
on target in two periods time.
2.2 Heterogeneity and Rational Partisan Theory
The above can be thought of as a highly stylised model for how the central
bank sees the world. We focus on a strict ination targeting regime, so
preference heterogeneity (that is, variation in ) is not meaningful. It is also
possible that individual members look to a wider information set than that
provided by projections or forecasts of only output and ination. It is known
that as part of the deliberations of the MPC prior to the announcement of a
decision on interest rates, a wide range of economic indicators are looked at.
Our empirical analysis, therefore, includes developments in housing markets,
exchange rates, equity and the labour market.
As emphasized in Hibbs (1994), a useful way to represent uncertainty,
and consequent heterogeneity within the MPC, is to assume partisan policy-
makers represent di¤erent views about the economy. In this paper, we take
the second view germane in the rational partisan theory (Chappell and
Keech, 1986; Alesina, 1987, 1988), and attribute heterogeneity to rational
partisan decision-making within the MPC.
However, our model is somewhat di¤erent from other applications of par-
tisan political cycles to monetary policy. Specically, our main focus here
12This is not a general result. In a model with a more complicated transmission mech-
anism, in response to a shock to the ination rate which knocked it o¤ the target, the
optimal rule might indicate that it would require a series of changes to the interest rate
in order to bring ination back on target.
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is on forecast uncertainty, and on how this translates into di¤ering views on
the magnitude of the output gap, which in turn leads to variations in votes
across members of the MPC. For this purpose, we start with the two-sector
rational partisan theory model discussed, among others, in Morton (1996),
where votersresponses to unanticipated shocks vary with the sectors that
they represent13. This is because the shocks cause di¤erent variation in out-
put in di¤erent sectors, and leads to higher activism for members anticipating
higher variation than others. In the context of a Monetary Policy Commit-
tee with members representing di¤erent sectors of the economy (see Waller,
1992), this framework implies that members form di¤erent private estimates
of the output gap, which when combined optimally with the central forecast
leads to di¤erences in preferred interest rate changes. Further, not only does
the degree of forecast uncertainty a¤ect these initial private estimates, they
are also related to the degree of activism demonstrated by di¤erent members
of the MPC.
Based on the above discussion, we adopt an approach in which heterogene-
ity arises from di¤ering views about the state of the economy, and specically
the level of the output gap.14 Each member has the same (public) informa-
tion set but augments this with private information. This can take di¤erent
forms. An individual member may dissent from the consensus forecast or an
individual member may have particular expertise that leads to more weight
being attached to particular kinds of information compared to the average.
Since the internal dynamics of committee decision making can result in a
measure of sharing of expertise (see Geanakoplos, 1992; Bicchieri, 1993),
we shall assume that the decision of each individual member is ultimately
based on commonly shared information as well as private views that cannot
be shared fully with the other members of the MPC, or to which the other
members of the Committee do not attach importance.
To model this process, we draw on a growing game theoretic literature
on committee decision making involving issues such as strategic voting, the
acquisition of information, possible conicts of interest, and how informa-
13It should be stressed here that the individual members of the MPC are not represen-
tatives of particular interests or sectors. They retain their independence but nevertheless
have views that attach greater importance to some parts of the economy.
14In the discussion of di¤ering views of the MPC members in the September 2006 meet-
ing of the MPC (Bank of England, 2006), there is explicit acknowledgement that di¤erent
members place di¤erent weights on the same macroeconomic events and implicitly also
that they may hold di¤erent views on the magnitude of the output gap.
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tion is communicated in committees (see Gerling et al. (2005) for a survey).
Following this line of research, we can think of the decision-making process
by the MPC as a two-stage process. In this rst stage there is deliberation
about the state of the economy (Gerlach-Kristen, 2003; Meade and Stasav-
age, 2004), sta¤ economists present conjunctural analyses of recent events,
members share information and views and eventually a central forecast, with
agreed error bands in the form of a fan chart, is arrived at. Nevertheless, at
the second stage, despite this sharing of knowledge many MPC members will
choose an interest setting di¤erent to the central estimate.
This process can be cast as a simple signal extraction problem. Sup-
pose there is an estimate of the output gap ybt , which is agreed upon after
deliberation. This is an unbiased estimate of the true output gap with15
ybt = yt + !
b
t with !
b
t v N(0; 2!b): (8)
Each committee member in turn formulates her own estimate of the out-
put gap as:
yjt = x
j
t + !
j
t with !
j
t v N(0; 2!j); for j = 1; ::m; (9)
where xj denotes a g  1 vector of possible variables that the j-th MPC
member may take notice of (including private information contained in asset
and labour market developments, for example), and
yt = E
 
xjt

: (10)
The j-th variance term 2!j captures both objective and subjective condence
in the estimate of yts. For the j-th member the estimate of yt that minimises
the forecast error variance and combines optimally the bank forecast and the
private forecast is given by:
ydjt = y
b
t + 
j(yjt   ybt ); (11)
where ydjt is the nal estimate by the j-th member of the output gap and 
j
is:
j =
2
!b
2
!b
+ 2
!j
: (12)
15Strictly speaking, the fan charts that the Bank produces allow for possible asymmetry,
and hence the errors may not be normally distributed. We assume normality for the sake
of simplicity.
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Clearly the more condent the committee member is in her own judgement
the smaller 2!j , and the less weight is attached to the collective forecast.
The internal versus external divide within the MPC, our main focus
of analysis, has interesting connections with both rational partisan theory
(Waller, 2007) and incentives and reputations of individual members (Sibert,
2003). This connection is conveniently and popularly (see, for example, Hix
et al., 2007 and Gerlach-Kristen, 2004) expressed in terms of the dove-hawk
dimension. Specically, externally appointed members of the MPC tend to
be more dove-ish, in the sense that their decision rules (or votes) appear to
o¤er greater weight to output stabilisation. For example, in Wallers (2007)
partisan setting, it is in societys interest to appoint (in a bipartisan manner)
disproportionately more doves to the MPC to represent the unionised labour
market. This raises preference for output stabilisation, and therefore coun-
terbalances the e¤ect of a conservative central bank; see also Alesina (1987)
and Waller (1992).
Following the above literature, we relate the j-th members estimate of
the output gap to their position in the preference space. Assume members
at time period t are distributed along the dove-hawk dimension, where hj 2
( 1;1) represents the position of an individual member relative to the
central estimate. This indexed member has an initial estimate of the output
gap
yjt = y
b
t + hj!b ; (13)
where !b is the standard deviation of the central estimate that is published.
Further, we assume that extreme hawkish or doveish members place less
weight on the central forecast:
2!j = c=h
2
j ; c > 0:
From (7) and (11), the response of the j-th member to the current output
gap is
1
2
ydjt =
1
2
ybt +
1
2

j(yjt   ybt )

=
1
2
ybt +
1
2
f (hj!b) ; (14)
where c is some positive constant and
f (x) = x
1
1 + c
x2
" x;
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therefore f (hj!b) is increasing in both !b and hj.
Further, Sibert (2003) develops a model of opportunistic behaviour in
MPCs, where members are either hawks or doves, but their type is private
information. Further, some doves may masquerade as hawks to reduce ina-
tionary expectations which they can exploit later. Hix et al. (2007) nd that
the degree of hawkishness of some members is hard to pin down; and Hansen
and McMahon (2008) provide evidence that the voting behaviour of mem-
bers of the Bank of Englands MPC indeed changes over the duration of their
tenure, along the lines argued in Sibert (2003). Based on the above theory
and evidence, we assume that degree of hawkishness, hj, is an unobserved
random e¤ect that potentially takes di¤erent values, in line with opportunis-
tic doves in Sibert (2003). We interpret the variance of this random e¤ect
as the degree of activism of an indivdual member, which determines how
much hawkishness can vary. Further, we can therefore hypothesise that in-
ternal MPC members may in general be conservative hawks, while external
members are either doves or activists (Siberts opportunist doves).
The decision rule for the j-th member can now be written as:
ijt = tjt+
1
2
(t+1jt )+1
2
ybt+
1
2
f (hj!b)+&jt for j = 1; :::;m; (15)
where &jt is a zero mean process. The decision that is actually implemented,
it, is then a multiple of 25 basis points, and is the vote of the median
member16.
Two forms of heterogeneity arise in our model from possible partisan
responses to unanticipated shocks that induce members to di¤er about the
size of the output gap, even in the absence of preference heterogeneity; see
also Morton (1996). Some members may believe that the central estimate of
the output gap generated by the sta¤ of the Bank of England underestimates
improvements on the supply side that widens the output gap and places less
pressure on ination. In these circumstances a member may prefer on average
a lower interest rate. In this case the member is regarded as a dove. Equally,
there may be members who err on the side of caution and believe that the
central estimate of the output gap over-estimates the degree of slack in the
economy. These members who prefer higher interest rates on average are
16Strictly the voting is sequential, where the initial options are to raise, lower or the
keep the interest rate unchanged. If a majority votes for no change there is no further
voting. If the vote is for a change, either higher or lower, a vote is then needed on the
magnitude of the change.
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regarded as hawks. This kind of heterogeneity can be thought of as falling
along a dove-hawk dimension. The second form of heterogeneity is activism
related to changing degrees of hawkishness (Sibert, 2003).
In our empirical analysis, we segregate these two sources of heterogeneity
from one another. The rst source of heterogeneity is related to uncertainty
about forecasts of the output gap, which can be measured from the fan charts
of output growth published by the Bank of England. The second source of
heterogeneity is related to the level of activism of a particular member, and
can be identied from the residuals of a regression model in which the rst
source of heterogeneity has been controlled for.
3 Data and Econometric models
3.1 The information set and measurement of variables
In this section we turn to an empirical examination of monetary policy in
the UK. The model discussed in the previous section is a highly stylised
characterisation of the process of monetary policymaking. Before moving to
an empirical examination of actual decision making, we rst outline the two
main research questions that our empirical analysis will seek to answer.
First, we wish to test the hypothesis that interest rates will respond more
to forecasts of ination and output than to current and lagged states of the
economy, using information provided regularly by the Bank of England in
the Ination Report. We collected information on the kinds of data that
the MPC looked at for each monthly meeting. Not all of this information
is made use of in this paper but the important issue was to ensure that we
conditioned only on what information was actually available at the time of
each meeting. Second, based on our model of heterogeneity described in
the previous section, we intend to characterise the belief or preference space
of the MPC members. Specically, in addition to the dove-hawk scale, we
investigate how far the activist-pacist dimension additionally included in
our analysis enhances inferences on partisan voting behaviour. Further, we
investigate whether the position of individual members on the preference
space provides additional insights into the political economy of monetary
policy decision making.
Our dependent variable is the change in base rate agreed by the MPC
at each of its meetings, from June 1997 to March 2005; these meetings are
13
monthly and held in the rst week of each month, except September 2001
when an additional meeting was held following the events on September
11. Our study of heterogeneity among the members of the MPC is based
on decisions of the individual members. The source for these data are the
minutes of the MPC meetings.
Assessing monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about
forecast levels of ination and the output gap requires collection of real-time
data available to the policymakers when interest rate decisions are made as
well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This contrasts with many studies
of monetary policy which are based on realised (and subsequently revised)
measures of economic activity (see Orphanides, 2003). The extent to which
there is uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of England can be inferred
from the fan charts published in the Ination Report (Britton et al., 1998).
We also collected information on unemployment, as well data on the un-
derlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices and exchange
rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change in Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) rate of unemployment, lagged 3 months.
The ILO rate of unemployment is computed using 3 month rolling average
estimates of the number of ILO-unemployed persons and size of labour force
(ILO denition), both collected from the O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS)
Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the year-on-year
growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally adjusted)
for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and exchange
rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE 100 share
index and the e¤ective exchange rate respectively at the end of the previous
month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information included
in the model is the current level of ination; this is measured by the year-
on-year growth rate of RPIX headline ination lagged 2 months (Source:
ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future ination and forecasts of
current and future output. One di¢ culty with using the Banks forecasts of
ination is that they are not su¢ ciently informative. By denition, the Bank
targets ination over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) ination hits the target in two years time. To
do anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure
of future ination, we use the 4 year ahead ination expectations implicit
in bond markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be
inferred from the Bank of Englands forward yield curve estimates obtained
14
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Current inflation and uncertainty
Figure 1: Forecast output growth and ination, and their uncertainty
from index linked bonds.17 For current output, we use annual growth of 2-
month-lagged monthly GDP published by the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research (NIESR) and for one-year-ahead forecast GDP growth,
we use the Bank of Englands model based mean quarterly forecasts.
As measures of forecast uncertainty, we use the standard deviation of the
one-year-ahead forecasts of output growth and ination. These measures are
obtained from the Bank of Englands fan charts of output and ination re-
spectively; details regarding these measures are discussed elsewhere (Britton
et al., 1998). The forecasts of output growth and its standard deviation, and
likewise for ination and its standard deviation, show substantial variation
over time (Figure 1).
3.2 An interval censoring model of base rate changes
Interest rate changes are highly clustered, with a majority of the meetings
proposing no change in the base rate (see Figure 2). For the Bank of England
17We use the four year expected ination gure because the two year gure is not
available for the full sample. In practice the ination yield curve tends to be very at
after two years.
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Figure 2: Discrete (Limited Dependent) nature of interest rate changes
MPC over the period of our analysis (June 1997 to March 2005), 69 per
cent of the meetings decided to keep the base rate at its current level, 14
per cent recommended a rise of 25 basis points, 13 per cent recommended a
reduction of 25 basis points, and 4 per cent a reduction of 0.50 per cent. This
clustering has to be taken into account when studying decisions of the MPC.
We do not observe changes in interest rates on a continuous or unrestricted
scale, we have a limited dependent response variable. Moreover, changes in
interest rates are in multiples of 25 basis points. So, in this paper, we use
an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors have used other
limited dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit or multinomial/
ordered logit/ probit framework. Our choice of model is based on the need to
use all the information that is available when monetary policy decisions are
made, as well as problems relating to model specication and interpretation
of multinomial logit models. We also explored the multinomial and ordered
logit models, and found the empirical conclusions to be similar.
The interval regression model (Amemiya, 1973) is a generalisation of the
tobit model where the truncation in the dependent variable is possibly dif-
ferent for di¤erent observation units, and the truncation cut-o¤s are known.
The observed dependent variable in our case, 4rt;obs, is the truncated version
16
of the latent monetary policy response variable, 4rt, which we model as
4rt;obs =  0:5 if 4rt 2 ( 1; 0:375)
=  0:25 if 4rt 2 [ 0:375; 0:20)
= 0 if 4rt 2 [ 0:20; 0:20]
= 0:25 if 4rt 2 (0:20; 0:375]
= 0:5 if 4rt 2 (0:375;1)
The wider truncation interval when interest rates are unchanged (ie., for
4rt;obs = 0) may be interpreted as reecting the conservative stance of mon-
etary policy under uncertainty with a bias in favour of leaving interest rates
unchanged.
Under this observation scheme, we estimate the following model of MPC
ination targeting:
4rt = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt (16)
+6yt+1jt + 7
 
t+1jt

+ 
 
yt+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + "t;
where Zt 1 represents current observations on unemployment (4ut) and the
underlying state of asset markets: housing, equity and the foreign exchange
market (Phsg;t, PFTSE;t and Pexch;t respectively). The standard deviation of
the one-year ahead forecast of ination is denoted by 
 
t+1jt

, and likewise,

 
yt+1jt

denotes standard deviation of forecast output growth. These terms
are included to incorporate the notion that the stance of monetary policy
may depend on uncertainty relating to current levels of output gap (as well as
forecast future output and ination). We include the term rt 1 in the model
to encompass a model in which the right hand side could be in terms of the
level rather than the di¤erence of the interest rate. Expressing it this way ts
more naturally into an interval regression framework where it is the size of
the change in the interest rate that determines into which interval it ts. As
discussed earlier, heterogeneity in the e¤ect of forecast uncertainty captures
partisan responses to uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment. An
important objective of our analysis will be to capture and characterise such
heterogeneity.
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TABLE 1: Heterogeneity among members:
Voting records of selected MPC members (Jun. 1997 to Mar. 2005)
Member Meetings Votes Dissent
Lower No change Raise Total High Low
Allsopp 37 18 19 0 11 0 11
Barker 47 9 32 6 4 1 3
Bean 55 10 40 5 1 0 1
Buiter 36 10 10 16 17 9 8
George 74 15 51 8 0 0 0
Goodhart 36 7 18 11 3 3 0
Julius 45 18 25 2 14 0 14
King 95 14 58 23 12 12 0
Nickell 59 15 35 9 10 4 6
Wadhwani 37 16 18 3 13 0 13
3.3 Model of base rate changes with xed e¤ects het-
erogeneity
Each member of the MPC arrives at her own decision regarding interest rates,
and committee interest rate decisions are arrived at by voting on these indi-
vidual proposals. In addition to the majority decision, the Bank of England
also publishes the changes in interest rate proposed by each member of the
committee. The voting pattern of individual members of the MPC suggests
substantial systematic di¤erences across the committee (Table 1).
For example, of the 37 meetings which Allsopp attended, the votes for 11
were against the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest
rate. Similarly, Julius voted against the consensus motion in 14 of the 45
meetings; all of these in favour of a lower interest rate. Wadhwani disagreed
13 out of 37 times, each time in favour of a lower interest rate. On the other
hand, King disagreed with the consensus decision in 12 of the 95 meetings he
attended, voting for a higher interest rate each time. Buiter dissented in 17
meetings out of 36, voting on 8 occasions for a lower interest rate and 9 times
in favour of a higher one. Nickell favoured a di¤erent interest rate decision
in 10 of the 59 meetings; 6 for a lower interest rate and 4 for a higher interest
rate. These data on individual votes o¤ers the opportunity to examine the
voting pattern in MPC meetings, and the resulting majority decision; see
also King (2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
In the model of section 2 we have suggested that uncertainty about fore-
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casts will a¤ect monetary policy decisions. Moreover, that there will be het-
erogeneity in the way individual members incorporate this uncertainty about
future levels of output (or di¤erent notions about full employment level of
future output) into their decisions. This suggests an empirical model of indi-
vidual MPC membersdecisions which allows for potential heterogeneity in
the e¤ect, , that 
 
yt+1jt

has on the interest rate decisions.
However, a simple analysis of the voting records of individual members
does not necessarily establish whether a member is a hawk or a dove and
an activist or a pacist. Most external members serve for three years and
it is possible that their term of o¢ ce coincides with a period, when because
of the position of the business cycle, interest rates are rising or falling. We
need to condition the analysis of heterogeneity on the state of the economy.
Under a similar interval regression framework as above, we would then have
the model:
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt (17)
+6yt+1jt + 7
 
t+1jt

+ iIit
 
yt+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + "it;
where Iit = I [i 2MPCt] is the indicator that member i was present at the
MPC meeting on date t, i represents the xed e¤ects responsiveness of
member is decision to uncertainty in the output gap, t+1jt and yt+1jt de-
note the expected/ forecasted value for ination and output, and 
 
t+1jt

and 
 
yt+1jt

denote the uncertainty in future ination and output respec-
tively. The latent variables 4rit are assigned to intervals in the same way as
earlier. However, here there are occasions when individuals MPC members
have voted for a reduction of 40 or 75 basis points, or an increase of 50 basis
points, hence all votes for change of more than 25 basis points have been
assigned to the intervals [rit;obs   0:125;rit;obs + 0:125).
3.4 Random e¤ects models of base rate changes with
heterogeneity among members
The above xed e¤ects formulation, however, cannot capture one important
aspect of the heterogeneity in the decision processes of MPC members 
namely, the degree of activism. As noted earlier, some MPC membersdeci-
sions are characterized by a greater degree of variability than some others.18
18Buiter and Nickell are prominent examples (Table 1). Both have disagreed from the
consensus interest rate decisions at a substantial number of meetings, but their proposals
19
A convenient way of modeling the decision processes of MPC members that
captures such features would be through a random e¤ects model; the response
of a more activist member would be characterised by a higher variance of the
e¤ect of 
 
yt+1jt

. A standard application of random e¤ects in this context
would be the model
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt + 6yt+1jt
+7
 
t+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + uit;
where
uit = iIit
 
yt+1jt

+ "it;
i v N (i; 2i ) ; "it v N (0; 2) ; and "it and i are independently distributed.
However, this model is not identied. One can only work with this model
if 2 = 0, which is not satisfactory.
An alternative random e¤ects model is the following:
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt + 6yt+1jt
+7
 
t+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + (
 + i) Iit
 
yt+1jt

;

i

v N


i

;

2 0i
0i 
2
i

; (18)
0 = n+
IX
i=1
nii;
is are independent of each other,
where  represents the typical response of monetary policy to uncertainty,
i is the response of the i-th MPC member,
19 and n and nis are the total
number of meetings, and the number of meetings that member i attends
respectively. Recall the discussion in the previous section regarding the two
sources of heterogeneity. This model allows the segregation of the uncertainty
term into these two parts, one that is common to all members (depending
only on the overall degree of forecast uncertainty), and the other incorporates
individual-specic heterogeneity in the degree of activism.
have not been predominantly above or below the consensus decision.
19Note that we do not assume independence of  and i, but assume that they are
jointly normally distributed.
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We estimate this model by assuming that new MPC members go with
the general ow for a period of time (the rst 3 meetings in our case) before
their individual views start getting expressed.20 Thus, we can use the votes
of all the MPC members in these three initial meetings to estimate  and
2, and votes in the subsequent meetings to estimate the individual specic
heterogeneity parameters. We further assume that 
 
yt+1jt

is uncorrelated
with the other regressors.21 We rst estimate the regression
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt + 6yt+1jt
+7
 
t+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + uit
(using a heteroscedasticity-consistent estimator) and use the computed resid-
uals to construct buit=  yt+1jt.22 Finally, we compare the means in an analy-
sis of variance (ANOVA) framework, after taking account of the di¤erences
in variance for di¤erent levels of the design variable (in this case, one for
each member and a common e¤ect corresponding to ). In this way, we can
identify signicant contrasts (di¤erence in means) between  and the is,
and between di¤erent is, while allowing the variances of the heterogeneity
term to di¤er across the members.
3.5 A random coe¢ cients model
The random e¤ects model in the previous subsection has the limitation that
the restriction on the magnitudes of the random e¤ect means ( and is) de-
pends on the design through n and the nis. This limitation can be overcome
20Some recent work (Sibert, 2003, for example) suggest that such an assumption
is justiable from a theoretical point of view. This assumption also appears to be
justied in the present context of members of the Bank of England MPC. The rst
vote against the motion for the 19 MPC members have been in meeting number
(1; 1; 2; 4; 4; 5; 8; 8; 8; 9; 9; 9; 9+; 10; 18; 19; 20; 23; 74+) (+ denotes censored to the right).
Further, none of the 19 members have proposed an interest rate lower than the consensus
decision within the rst 3 meetings; see also Hansen and McMahon (2008).
21This is not an unreasonable assumption; the squared multiple correlation coe¢ cient
of 
 
yt+1jt

on all the other exogenous regressors is 0:343 and that on the two expected
output variables is only 0:054, while the correlation coe¢ cient between 
 
yt+1jt

and
yt+1jt is only  0:096.
22Since rit and 4rit are not directly observable, we use buit = rit;obs   brit as a proxy,
where brit is obtained using the estimates from the above regression. This construction of
pseudo residuals, buit, would be asymptotically valid if the widths of the censoring windows
reduce to zero as n  !1.
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by considering the following random coe¢ cients model:
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt + 6yt+1jt
+7
 
t+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + itIit
 
yt+1jt

+ "it; (19)
it are random coe¢ cients independent of each other and of "it;
it v N
 
i; 
2
i

; "it v N
 
0; 2

:
Under the interval regression framework considered earlier, we rst esti-
mate the slope-heterogeneity xed e¤ects model:
4rit = 0 + 1:4rt 1 + 2rt 1 + 3t + 4t+1jt + 5ytjt + 6yt+1jt
+7
 
t+1jt

+ 0Zt 1 + iIit
 
yt+1jt

+ "it:
Now, if we can estimate the regression residuals, b"it, the signicance of
di¤erences in means (contrasts) can be tested, using
bit = b"it

 
yt+1jt
 + bi
as a pseudo-sample from the distribution of it. In our application, the
residuals cannot be directly obtained, since the response variable is censored.
However, one can either use b"it = rit;obs   brit as pseudo-residuals (as earlier),
or bootstrap from the distribution of the "it, and then use this sample to
evaluate the contrasts. This would constitute another way to identify sig-
nicant contrasts between di¤erent is, while allowing the variances of the
heterogeneity term to di¤er across the members.
4 Results
We estimate the xed e¤ects models (16) and (17) and the random e¤ects
model (18); estimates of the random coe¢ cients model (19) are similar to
the random e¤ects model and are not reported here.
4.1 Majority decisions of the MPC
Table 2 presents parameter estimates and goodness-of-t measures for the
model in which the dependent variable is the actual decision implemented by
the MPC. Results using OLS and interval regression are reported; multino-
mial logit estimates are similar.
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TABLE 2: Ination Targeting Model Estimates,
Majority MPC Interest Rate Decisions (Jul.1997 to Mar.2005)23
Variables Ordinary Interval IV Interval
Least Squares Regression Regression
4rt 1  0:091(0:107)  0:125(0:116)  0:139(0:104)
rt 1  0:019(0:042)  0:012(0:046)  0:0002(0:042)
t 0:010(0:053) 0:022(0:046) 0:042(0:053)
t+1jt 0:123(0:037) 0:149(0:038) 0:144(0:040)
yt 0:005(0:033) 0:019(0:035) 0:015(0:031)
yt+1jt 0:115(0:057) 0:151(0:061) 0:136(0:055)
4ut  0:185(0:091)  0:192(0:104)+  0:163(0:090)+
Phsg;t 0:737(0:569) 0:950(0:652) 0:387(0:551)
PFTSE;t 0:141(0:177) 0:376(0:186)
 0:033(0:177)
Pexch;t 0:005(0:003) 0:006(0:004) 0:009(0:004)


 
yt+1jt
  0:386(0:508)  0:397(0:602)  0:580(0:511)

 
t+1jt

0:897(0:569) 0:980(0:606) 1:432(0:040)
constant  0:588(0:426)  0:892(0:528)+  0:761(0:404)+
Number of meetings 94 94 94
Goodness of t F (12; 81) = 7:55 Wald 2(12) = 73:67 Wald 2(12) = 105:76
Prob: > F = 0:0000 Prob: > 2 = 0:0000 Prob: > 2 = 0:0000
R2 = 0:5032 Log pseudo-likelihood Log pseudo-likelihood
RMSE = 0:1249 =  44:8800 =  37:8870
It is clear that expected ination and expected output matter for the
interest rate decision; currently observed ination and output play no signif-
icant role. This conrms the assertion of Section 2 that the Bank of England
follows an ination forecast regime. It is also noticeable that movements
in the stock market and housing market are signicant. The coe¢ cients on
unemployment and exchange rate have the right sign but are not signicant.
The impact of output uncertainty is negative, but not signicant. By con-
trast the coe¢ cient on ination uncertainty is positive.24 Interestingly, the
coe¢ cients on 4rt 1 and rt 1 are never signicant.25
23 , and +signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; SEs in brackets.
24The correlation between output and ination uncertainty is very low, about 0:03. The
signs suggest that if there is an increase in uncertainty about output, conditional on all
the other variables in the model, interest rates are likely to be lower than otherwise. While
if there is an increase in uncertainty about ination interest rates are likely to be raised.
25There is a large literature that tries to account for a common observation that interest
rates are smoothed. The results here suggest that once we have conditioned on the set of
23
However, there is a potential endogeneity issue. While it is reasonable to
regard t; yt; yt+1jt;4ut and Phsg;t as weakly exogenous, the same is not true
for t+1jt; PFTSE;t and Pexch;t. Anticipation of interest rate decisions can lead
to near contemporaneous movements in asset prices. Instrumental variable
estimates of the interval regression model are also reported in Table 2.26 The
results are broadly similar.
4.2 Individual decisions under heterogeneity
We now examine heterogeneity within the MPC using the published inter-
est rate decisions of individual MPC members (over the period July 1997
to March 2005). In this case we are exploiting the extra information that is
provided by the published voting records of each of the Committee members.
In addition to a model where the votes of individual MPC members reveal
their own (heterogeneous) types, we also estimate a model where the mem-
bers belong to two types, depending on whether they are internal members
(from the Bank of England) or external MPC members.27
In our model we include uncertainty in both output and ination. How-
ever, we allow for heterogeneity only in output uncertainty. An LR test for
the hypothesis of homogeneity in ination uncertainty, after heterogeneity in
output uncertainty is allowed for is not rejected (Likelihood ratio test (LRT):
 2: lnL = 19:59, 18 d.f., p-value 0:356.). The same holds if we allow for het-
erogeneity in ination uncertainty rst. However, we have a model that
allows us to interprete heterogeneity in the response to output uncertainty
so we assume that there is a homogeneous response to ination uncertainty.
explanatory variables, there appears to be no persistence in interest rates.
26We used as instruments 4 lags of the potentially endogenous variables as well as the
remaining weakly exogenous variables. However, a Durban-Hausman test of endogeniety
does not reject the null of weak endogeneity. The p-values for the test were 0:279, 0:082
and 0:360 for t+4jt; PFTSE;t and Pexch;t respectively.
27See also Gerlach-Kristen (2003) for some similar analysis. Note that we classify John
Vickers as an external member even though formally he was appointed as an internal mem-
ber by the Bank of England. However, since he came straight from academia and returned
there on his departure, classifying him as an external member seems more appropriate.
24
TABLE 3: IV Model Estimates Individual MembersDecisions28
Variables Indiv. members Int. vs. Ext. No heterogeneity
4rt 1  0:114(0:043)  0:112(0:044)  0:116(0:046)
rt 1  0:012(0:019)  0:018(0:019)  0:015(0:020)
t+1jt 0:124(0:015) 0:121(0:014) 0:122(0:015)
yt+1jt 0:165(0:020) 0:153(0:021) 0:154(0:021)
4ut  0:198(0:033)  0:199(0:033)  0:193(0:034)
Phsg;t 1:148(0:195)
 1:336(0:191) 1:314(0:195)
PFTSE;t 0:460(0:072)
 0:515(0:071) 0:517(0:073)
Pexch;t 0:010(0:002)
 0:010(0:002) 0:009(0:002)

 
t+1jt

0:725(0:231) 0:733(0:236) 0:737(0:242)

 
yt+1jt
  0:545(0:287)+
 Allsopp  0:475(0:276)+
 Barker  0:412(0:278)
 Bean  0:402(0:278)
 Bell  0:451(0:280)
 Budd  0:380(0:277)
 Buiter  0:410(0:275)
 Clementi  0:399(0:275)
 George  0:403(0:275)
 Goodhart  0:393(0:276)
 Julius  0:535(0:276)+
 King  0:362(0:276)
 Lambert  0:411(0:282)
 Large  0:327(0:281)
 Lomax  0:412(0:283)
 Nickell  0:425(0:277)
 Plenderleith  0:412(0:275)
 Tucker  0:342(0:280)
 Vickers  0:371(0:275)
 Wadhwani  0:513(0:275)+
 INTERNAL  0:495(0:280)+
 EXTERNAL  0:560(0:280)
constant  0:658(0:223)  0:572(0:187)  0:567(0:191)
No. of member-meetings 753 753 753
Fit: Wald 2(Prob: > 2) 654:40(0:000) 614:63(0:000) 582:11(0:000)
Log pseudo-likelihood  533:50  553:38  569:64
28 , and +signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; SEs in brackets.
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4.2.1 Fixed e¤ects heterogeneity
Table 3 reports interval regression estimates and goodness-of-t measures for
the xed e¤ects model (17).29 In contrast to the results in Table 2 we found
it necessary to correct for endogeneity. We report, therefore, IV estimates
using the same instruments as in Table 2.
The broad conclusions from the model are similar to those for the ag-
gregate, implemented decision of the MPC. However, we now nd a more
signicant role for developments in asset markets. The higher signicance
of unemployment and asset market indicators may arise from either di¤er-
ing views among the MPC members or from larger sample size (since we are
modelling individual decisions here). In particular, heterogeneity seems to be
part of the explanation for the strong e¤ect of unemployment; the coe¢ cient
in the committee decision regression (Table 2) lies outside the 95 per cent
condence interval of the estimate in Table 3. Although not individually sig-
nicant, the heterogeneity coe¢ cients are jointly signicant at the 1 percent
level.30
4.2.2 Random e¤ects heterogeneity
The xed e¤ects estimates discussed above were not entirely satisfactory,
since this setup does not allow us to explore individual specic heterogeneity
after controlling for the activismapparent in some MPC members. Fur-
ther, as our discussion of partisan responses points out, di¤erences in private
estimates of the output gap may be related to the degree of activism. Thus,
while the lack of signicance may be due to a lower sample size, we would
like to control for the di¤erences in variance in a random e¤ects framework to
have a closer look at the contrasts (di¤erences in mean responses).31 Table 4
reports estimates of our random e¤ects model (18) (estimation sample: July
1997 to March 2005).
29We have dropped the t and yt from the following models since the terms are always
insignicant.
30Joint signicance of the 19 individual member heterogeneity terms Likelihood ratio
test (LRT):  2: lnL = 75:88, 19 d.f., p-value 0:000. Joint signicance of the internaland
externalheterogeneity terms (LRT):  2: lnL = 36:11, 2 d.f., p-value 0:000.
31This procedure ensures that the di¤erences in individual (mean) e¤ects are not masked
by di¤erences in variance the so-called Behrens-Fisher problem.
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TABLE 4: Ination Targeting Model Estimates,
Individual MembersInterest Rate Decisions Random E¤ects32 ;33 ;34
Variables bi qdV ar ( + i) = bV
Allsopp  0:0996 0:1322
Barker  0:0239 0:1381
Bean  0:0099 0:1126
Bell  0:0465 0:1341
Budd 0:0408 0:1470
Buiter 0:0118 0:2149
Clementi 0:0130 0:1379
George 0:0003 0:1220
Goodhart 0:0334 0:1631
Julius  0:0882 0:1369
King 0:0335 0:1426
Lambert  0:0003 0:1454
Large 0:0571 0:1438
Lomax 0:0003 0:1362
Nickell  0:0280 0:1534
Plenderleith 0:0093 0:1421
Tucker 0:0302 0:1412
Vickers 0:0445 0:1550
Wadhwani  0:0961 0:1481
The estimates capture several of the interesting features of heterogeneity
discussed earlier. There are several signicant contrasts, both with respect
to the typical average response of monetary policy  and between member-
specic average responses (is), and the estimates reect the expected direc-
tion of these contrasts. The degree of activismin any member is reected
in the estimated variance of +i, denoted bV . For example, Willem Buiter
is the most activist of all MPC members, but he did not have a particu-
lar bias in favour of lower or higher interest rates on average. By contrast,
DeAnne Julius had a signicant bias in favour of lower interest rates along
32The estimates do not explicitly assume independence of  and i.
33Signicant contrasts from b = 0:0411 are indicated in the Table. Other signicant
contrasts are: Goodhart   Julius : 0:1216+, Goodhart   Allsopp : 0:1301+, Goodhart  
Wadhwani : 0:1295
+, King Allsopp : 0:1301, King Julius : 0:1217, King Wadhwani :
0:1295, Large Julius : 0:1453, Large Allsopp : 0:1537, Large Wadhwani : 0:1532,
Vickers   Allsopp : 0:1411+, and Vickers   Wadhwani : 0:1405+.
34 , and +signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; SEs in brackets.
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Figure 3: Spatial voting patterns of individual MPC members
(Name codes: Table 5)
with Christopher Allsopp and Sushil Wadhwani, but they were not more
activist than the average. Charlie Bean stands out as being both close on
average to the actual MPC decision and about the least activist.
4.2.3 Dove-Hawk versus Activist-Pacist
In the context of the model of rational partisan behaviour presented earlier,
we now attempt to classify MPC members into types, based on their esti-
mated positions along the dove-hawk dimension and their degree of activism.
In Figure 3, we follow the spatial voting approach and plot the positions of
each individual member on the above two dimensional preference space. Sev-
eral important observations emerge from the plot.
First, the two dimensions, the traditional partisan dove-hawk scale and
activism, are somewhat related. Extreme doves and hawks are relatively
pacist, while centrist members are either activist or pacist. At the same
time, the dimensions are linearly almost orthogonal, which provides empirical
justication for classication along these dimensions. Second, and more im-
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portantly, the positions occupied by external and internal members are very
well separated in this preference space. Specically, as demonstrated in Ta-
ble 5, all internal members are pacist-hawks, while most external members
are either activists or pacist-doves.35
TABLE 5: Classication in the Preference Space
Categories/Members Status/Background First meeting
Activist (bV > 0:146)
Buiter (BT) External-Academia June 1997
Goodhart (GO) External-Academia June 1997
Nickell (NI) External-Academia June 2000
Vickers (VI) External-Academia June 1998
Budd (BD) External-Government Dec 1997
Pacifist-Hawk (bV < 0:146; bi >  0:01)
Lomax (LO) Internal July 2003
Large (LR) Internal Oct 2002
King (KI) Internal June 1997
Plenderleith (PL) Internal June 1997
Clementi (CL) Internal Sept 1997
George (GE) Internal June 1997
Bean (BN) Internal Oct 2000
Tucker (TU) Internal June 2002
Lambert (LM) External-Journalism June 2003
Pacifist-Dove (bV < 0:146; bi <  0:01)
Bell (BL) External-Finance July 2002
Julius (JU) External-Industry Sept 1997
Wadhwani (WA) External-Finance June 1999
Allsopp (AL) External-Academia June 2000
Barker (BA) External-Industry June 2001
These observations have very important implications for policy relating
to institutional setting and political economy of monetary policy decision
making. This is particularly relevant against the context of the recent ob-
servation (Hix et al., 2007) of a link between appointments to the MPC and
political cycles. In particular, our observation that pacist external members
35An alternative classication as Dove (and Pacist), Hawk (and Pacist), Centrist-
Activist and Centrist-Pacist shows an association with internal/ external status and
background which falls along very similar lines.
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are doves rather than hawks emphasizes the usefulness of appointing MPC
members in a way that can counteract conservativemonetary policy and
replicate the social optimum; see also Waller (1992, 2007).
Further, our observation that external MPC members are more likely to
be activist supports the view that individual members have incentives to
gain a reputation for inationary toughness; therefore, some members may
choose to masquerade as conservative central bankers in the early part of
their tenure in the MPC (Sibert, 2003). In this monetary policy setting,
committee decision making leads to higher expected social welfare. Also,
lower transparency in the form of delayed publication of votes reduces in-
centives for such strategic behaviour. Relatedly, Felgenhauer and Grüner
(2008) show that transparency in the presence of external inuence provides
additional incentives for strategic voting by non-pivotal members in mone-
tary policy committees, even when median voting rule is used. Thus, our
observed structure of the preference space has important implications for de-
sign of committee structure, voting rules as well as appointment procedures.
Finally, Besley et al. (2008) estimate Taylor rules for di¤erent MPC
members and nd no signicant di¤erences between internal and external
members, and neither between members from di¤erent backgrounds. Their
inference is based on the observation that condence bands for long-run co-
e¢ cients in individual Taylor rules tend to overlap. At a rst glance, their
conclusions appears to be in contradiction with our results, as well as those
reported by other authors (see, for example, Hix et al., 2007 and Gerlach-
Kristen, 2004). However, the substantial variation in the width of condence
bands reported in Besley et al. (2008) is closely related to the activism di-
mension highlighted in this paper. Notwithstanding important di¤erences
in the estimated models, these results are in concurrence with our nding
that the activism dimension cannot be ignored in studies on heterogenity in
monetary policymaking.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered the conduct of UK monetary policy from
1997. Since then the Bank of England has had operational independence
and decisions on interest rates made by the majority verdict of a Monetary
Policy Committee. An enormous amount of information is provided about
the data made available to the MPC and the decisions on interest rates
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decided upon by individual members. We nd that an ination forecast
regime best describes what the MPC does but we also nd an important role
for developments in foreign exchange, equity and housing markets, once we
exploit the extra information that is available in the individual voting records
of MPC members. A role can also be found for unemployment. It is an open
question whether our ability to detect a role for variables other than ination
and output is due to heterogeneity across the members of the MPC. In other
words individual members may attach some importance to developments in
asset markets and reect these in an individual decision, which does not get
carried through to the collective decision.
Our model of monetary policy decision making within a commitee set-
ting highlight the way in which position of individual policy makers in the
preference space translate into di¤erent reaction to uncertainty in the output
gap. Further, we nd evidence of heterogeneity in the way uncertainty about
future levels of output and output gap a¤ect the interest rate decisions of
individual MPC members. This heterogeneity is reected in di¤erences in
preferred interest rate changes across members of the MPC.
Further, our analysis of spatial voting behaviour highlight an important
and hitherto unreported role for activism in partisan monetary policy re-
actions. This framework aligns itself remarkably with the background and
status of MPC members and has important implications for institutional
structure and political economy of monetary policy decision making. Fur-
ther analysis of these issues are important topics for future study.
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